Contributory factors in surgical incidents as delineated by a confidential reporting system by Mushtaq, F et al.
This is a repository copy of Contributory factors in surgical incidents as delineated by a 
confidential reporting system.




Mushtaq, F orcid.org/0000-0001-7881-1127, O’Driscoll, C, Smith, FCT et al. (3 more 
authors) (2018) Contributory factors in surgical incidents as delineated by a confidential 
reporting system. Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, 100 (5). pp. 





Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Contributory factors in surgical incidents as
delineated by a confidential reporting system
F Mushtaq1, C O’Driscoll2, FCT Smith3, D Wilkins4, N Kapur5, R Lawton1,6
1School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine and Health, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
2Division of Psychiatry, University College London, London, UK
3Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Bristol, UK
4Derriford Hospital, Plymouth, UK
5Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College London,
London, UK
6Bradford Institute for Health Research, Bradford, UK
ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND Confidential reporting systems play a key role in capturing information about adverse surgical events. However, the
value of these systems is limited if the reports that are generated are not subjected to systematic analysis. The aim of this study
was to provide the first systematic analysis of data from a novel surgical confidential reporting system to delineate contributory
factors in surgical incidents and document lessons that can be learned.
METHODS One-hundred and forty-five patient safety incidents submitted to the UK Confidential Reporting System for Surgery over
a 10-year period were analysed using an adapted version of the empirically-grounded Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework.
RESULTS The most common factors identified as contributing to reported surgical incidents were cognitive limitations (30.09%),
communication failures (16.11%) and a lack of adherence to established policies and procedures (8.81%). The analysis also
revealed that adverse events were only rarely related to an isolated, single factor (20.71%) – with the majority of cases involving
multiple contributory factors (79.29% of all cases had more than one contributory factor). Examination of active failures – those
closest in time and space to the adverse event – pointed to frequent coupling with latent, systems-related contributory factors.
CONCLUSIONS Specific patterns of errors often underlie surgical adverse events and may therefore be amenable to targeted
intervention, including particular forms of training. The findings in this paper confirm the view that surgical errors tend to be multi-
factorial in nature, which also necessitates a multi-disciplinary and system-wide approach to bringing about improvements.
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Introduction
The Institute of Medicine’s seminal report, To Err is
Human,1 helped to fuel intense debate and research on the
nature, frequency and magnitude of surgical errors.2,3 The
focus on surgery has been considerable, given the self-evi-
dent link between errors in the operating theatre and patient
safety.4 To improve quality and safety, the surgical field,
borrowing concepts from other high-risk industries,5 has
heavily promoted the use of incident reporting systems. Yet
such systems have been criticised as only providing a super-
ficial impression of safety improvement.6–8 In contrast, the
aviation industry regularly changes policy and practice on
the basis of this information.9–11
Within individual hospitals, the quality and quantity of
feedback is highly variable and often generic, thus limiting
specialty specific learning.8,9 In response, the Confidential
Reporting System for Surgery (CORESS) was established.10
Modelled on aviation systems, CORESS was seen as an inno-
vative development to produce a specialty-specific error
reporting and learning system with, uniquely, a one-to-one
mapping between incident report and feedback.
The past two decades of healthcare research have seen
the development of a number of theoretically grounded
frameworks that provide a structured approach to incident
analysis.11–14 The recently validated evidence-based frame-
work, the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework
(YCFF),15 recognises the broad spectrum of possible causes
of hospital based patient safety incidents. Central to the
YCFF is a systems-based approach to understanding errors,
where adverse events are viewed as a consequence of gaps
at multiple levels of a system – the product of a cumulative
process that can include active and latent failures.16
Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2018; 100: 401–405 401
PERIOPERATIVE CARE
Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2018; 100: 401–405
doi 10.1308/rcsann.2018.0025
The aim of this study was to establish the factors most
commonly contributing to surgical incidents by applying the
YCFF to CORESS reports.
Methods
All complete and anonymised safety incidents reports pub-
lished by the CORESS Advisory Committee over a 10-year
period (February 2005 to August 2015) were extracted. This
comprised a total of 145 reports describing diagnostic or
operative errors, technical failures, regulatory or procedural
limitations or unsafe practices/protocols. The reports
included reporter and feedback comments made by the
CORESS Advisory Committee. The latter were removed
before being shown to the coders to avoid the classification
process being biased by the committee’s recommendations.
Permission was obtained from the advisory commiteee to
examine these anonymised, publically available data.
The Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework
Inherent within the YCFF is the recognition that adverse
incidents can arise from errors at the sharp end (e.g. a
healthcare professional forgetting a key step of a protocol)
but also have more distal causes (latent organisational defi-
ciencies that could have been brewing in the system for
years). The framework specifically identifies 19 factors,
hierarchically ordered and arranged in order of proximity
(in time and space) to the adverse event across five classes,
together with overarching factors, described in Table 1.
To ensure that key contributory factors were identified
without inferring beyond the information provided in the
report, each patient safety incident was analysed by two
non-surgeon reviewers: one a neuropsychologist and the
other an expert in human factors. The primary raters were
each paired with a senior surgeon, who was consulted on
cases that were considered to require technical knowledge
of specific medical procedures (n = 31).
To enhance inter-rater reliability, 20 cases were first ana-
lysed by both reviewers independently. Agreement at this
stage was moderate (Cohen’s kappa .49), so a detailed
checklist with input from surgeons (authors FCTS and DW)
and a human factors expert (author RL), was produced, with
examples within each of the 19 domains that were relevant
in the context of surgical incidents. Further modification of
the checklist was undertaken and after two iterations on 10
randomly selected reports from a sample of 20, a high level
of inter-rater reliability (a ≥ .80) was achieved between the
two primary raters on this subset of the data. The remaining
125 reports were randomly allocated to the two primary
raters and independently assessed.
Table 1 Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework Structure
Factor Description
1. Active failures Includes cognitive limitations, which encompass a broad spectrum of human performance related behaviours
from lapses in judgement to sensorimotor errors. Examples include cutting corners that violate safe operating
practices through to more implicit memory-related factors.
2. Situational factors Covers multidisciplinary teams (where issues may arise from professionals from different specialties working
together, individuals (the person delivering the care may have contributed to the failure; e.g. through
inexperience, attitude or stress induced by workload pressure), patients (clinical characteristics that increase
probability of error; e.g. dysphasic or suffering from cognitive difficulties) and task related factors (such as
the novelty and risk of the procedure).
3. Local working conditions Relates to local working conditions that can contribute to adverse events such as equipment and supplies
(the availability and functionality of equipment), lines of responsibility (and clarity around individual
responsibility), supervision and leadership, management of staff (absence of skilled support) and staffing
levels along with staff workload (e.g. ratio of staff relative to patient volume), and the physical environment
(such as room layout, noise, lighting and temperature).
4. Latent organisational
factors
Describes latent organisational factors, such as policy and procedures (e.g. poor quality or no standard
operating procedures for equipment), bed scheduling factors – which result in treatment delays, the amount
of support available from central services including clinical (availability of pharmacy or radiology support)
through to non-clinical factors such as information technology and human factors. This class also includes
training and education factors and the availability and appropriateness of induction training, and continuing
professional development programmes.
5. Latent external factors Groups two latent external factors – the design of equipment and supplies (e.g. the design of the equipment
impaired performance), and the external policy context – nationally driven directives that impact on the level
and quality of resources available to hospitals with guidelines from the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence and the European Working Time Directive as examples.
6. Overarching factors Incorporates communication systems (the effectiveness of the processes and systems in place for the
exchange and sharing of information between staff, groups, departments and services) and safety culture
issues (beliefs and practices surrounding the management of safety and learning from error), and is mapped
across all five classes.
402 Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2018; 100: 401–405
MUSHTAQ O’DRISCOLL SMITH WILKINS KAPUR LAWTON CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS IN SURGICAL INCIDENTS AS DELINEATED
BY A CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING SYSTEM
Results
The frequency of the identified contributory factors for the
raters was logged (329 factors from 145 reports; Fig 1).
Cognitive limitations (n = 99; 30.09%), communication
systems issues (n = 53; 16.11%) and policy and procedure
factors (n = 29; 8.81%) were most frequently identified in
these incident reports. To provide a more coherent picture
of these 19 factors, these data were organised, based on the
hierarchical classification proposed by the YCFF (Fig 1
inset), ordering by proximity of the factor to the incident, in
time and space.
Situational factors, particularly those associated with task
characteristics (specifically, the novelty and difficulty of per-
forming the surgery) were logged in 15.5% (n = 51) of inci-
dents. Local working conditions issues were classified in
18.54% (n = 61) of the event, with issues relating to clarity
around roles and responsibilities and low staff to patient
ratios. Factors furthest from the error in time and space –
latent organisational (n = 42) and external factors (n = 11) –
were identified in 16.11% of incidents. The contribution of
these reflected issues around surgical technologies (i.e.
design, adequacy and availability) and issues around poli-
cies and protocols (specifically, lack thereof), often hinder
performance.
The data were further analysed to identify co-occurrence
rates. Single factor incidents (i.e. only one contributory fac-
tor for an incident) accounted for 20.71% of the total number
of reports. The data also revealed that the majority of inci-
dents included two (42.14%) or three (24.2%) contributors
(Fig 2a). The aim was to unpack this further by examining
co-occurrence rates for each contributor. However, within
the current dataset, it was only feasible to probe incident
reports with our most frequent type of contributor – active
failure (Fig 2b). Here, only 17% of reports showed that this
factor was a sole contributor. Active failures were most often
accompanied by situational factors (37.37% of cases), local
working conditions (35.35%), latent external factors
(25.25%) and communication and safety culture related con-
tributors (37.37%).
Discussion
The most common factors identified as contributing to
reported surgical incidents were cognitive limitations, com-
munication failures and a lack of adherence to established
policies and procedures. Adverse events were only rarely
related to an isolated, single factor, with the majority of
cases involving multiple contributory factors.
The primary findings (i.e. a high frequency of cognitive
limitations) are consistent with and complement other
recent attempts to systematically analyse error in health-
care. For example, Flin et al. found that the most frequent
types of errors that anaesthetists experienced in complica-
tions for airway management related to situational aware-
ness or cognitive processes preceding an action error.17
They most often found failures in attention, concentration,
problem solving, decision making and memory – which
share substantial overlap with the cognitive limitations fac-
tor in the present study. Another recent human-factors based
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Figure 1 Safety incidents classified by factor based on the
Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (YCFF). The inset dis-
plays a summary of the rate of the 329 classifications by a hier-
archical classification separating the factors by their proximity
in time and space to the adverse event – ranging from active
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Figure 2 (a) Examination of the rate of co-occurrence of factors shows that two and three contributors per incident were most prevalent.
(b) From the subset of 99 cases classified as active failures, we found that these issues were often likely to co-occur with other contribu-
tors. These data show the frequency rates of each additional factor for these incidents.
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knowledge based analysis) featured in 157 out of 498
incidents.18
The second most frequent factor related to communica-
tion system-related issues, which also dovetails with pre-
vious work.19,20 In an analysis of malpractice claims, where
the surgical errors led to patient injury, technical compe-
tence and communication breakdowns were the most fre-
quently identified issues.21 A detailed analysis of 30 adverse
surgical events using a systems theory-based approach as an
alternative to root cause analysis highlighted the importance
of communication systems – where unsatisfactory systems
lead to inconsistent processes, causing delays and misunder-
standings in the delivery of care.22 While the current analy-
sis could not tease apart the types of communication failure
contributing to incidents, previous work has shown that the
majority of communication breakdowns happen at one-to-
one level between transmitter and receiver, often through
status asymmetries, uncertainty over job responsibilities and
during hand over.23 It is important to stress that while cogni-
tive factors were particularly frequent, they may be the end
product of other factors increasing the probability of their
occurrence.
Some of the limitations of the present study can be sepa-
rated into issues around quantity and quality of the reports.
CORESS has been active for over a decade, but has yielded
only a small number of reports. A recent survey of members
of the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland
found that 47% of respondents reported a significant error
in their own performance and 75% were aware of a col-
league experiencing error.24 Yet 12% of surgeons were
unaware of the procedure for reporting an error and 59%
thought that more guidance was needed. Most surprisingly,
40% indicated that a confidential reporting system (such as
the one created by the ASGBI a decade earlier) would
increase the likelihood of them reporting an error. It appears
that more work is required to engage the surgical commun-
ity to increase reporting practices. One approach may be to
incorporate error logging into annual appraisals. This might
also address issues around the selective nature of submis-
sions – which provide only a small window into the nature of
adverse surgical events.
Alongside quantity, improving the quality of incident
reports is also imperative. One recommendation is that COR-
ESS could change the layout and logging procedure (e.g. with
prompts based on the factors we have identified) to allow one
to reflect more on the incident. Such a step would be useful in
discriminating between different types of cognitive limita-
tions.25 Future research needs to evaluate the existing report-
ing method in light of our results and consider ways in which
the reporting form could be optimised to improve data quality
by aligning the information gathered with existing analysis
tools.26
While the checklist created for framework analysis was
designed to be objective, the fact that the two primary raters
in this study were specialists in psychology and human fac-
tors may have introduced a form of implicit bias. It is also
worth considering alternative, complementary methods that
could facilitate our understanding of adverse events in sur-
gery through high-quality data. Some, for example, have
suggested the adoption of a mandatory live recording of a
procedure.27 The presence of a video after an adverse event
would provide an information rich resource for identifying,
reflecting and learning about errors and could also be useful
as an education tool for operating staff to improve intraoper-
ative performance.28–30
This analysis does not speak to preventability (indeed, ret-
rospective interpretations of preventability may be in the eye
of the beholder),31 but it is worth considering interventions
that could act as remedial strategies to target these errors.
Issues around equipment and supplies appear to be readily
amenable to intervention. The development of smart grasp-
ers that provide haptic feedback to guide the surgeon pro-
vides an illustration of how surgical technologies can
reduce errors relating to the trauma caused by forceful
instrument grasping.32 Cognitive errors of misidentifying an
appendix as a fallopian tube could be amenable to percep-
tual identification training that included morphed versions
of each structure. Similarly, communication skills training
may address some of the issues in surgery that were high-
lighted in this study.33
Given the increasing complexity and prevalence of endo-
scopic and robotic procedures, incidents linked to task char-
acteristics and technical competence may increase over
time. The opportunities offered by simulation training for
surgical skill acquisition have been well documented, but
the field has yet to fully exploit these methods (which may,
in part, be due to system and resource-related con-
straints).34–40 Interventions that directly target cognitive and
motor preparation are showing promise. The benefits of
‘warming up’ for optimal surgical performance are becom-
ing clearer,41–43 with emerging evidence indicating that the
risk of intraoperative errors related in perceptual identifica-
tion and spatial orientation might be ameliorated by preop-
erative interaction with virtual and physical visual aids.44,45
Such interventions are unlikely to work in isolation, how-
ever; healthcare delivery is a complex process involving the
interactions of dynamical systems and, as such, interven-
tions at the proximal level need to be considered in the con-
text of the system in which they are embedded.46
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